Abstract-Malicious users can exploit the correlation among data to infer sensitive information from a series of seemingly innocuous data accesses. Thus, we develop an inference violation detection system to protect sensitive data content. Based on data dependency, database schema, and semantic knowledge, we constructed a semantic inference model (SIM) that represents the possible inference channels from any attribute to the preassigned sensitive attributes. The SIM is then instantiated to a semantic inference graph (SIG) for query-time inference violation detection. For a single user case, when a user poses a query, the detection system will examine his/her past query log and calculate the probability of inferring sensitive information. The query request will be denied if the inference probability exceeds the prespecified threshold. For multiuser cases, the users may share their query answers to increase the inference probability. Therefore, we develop a model for evaluating collaborative inference based on the query sequences of collaborators and their task-sensitive collaboration levels. Experimental studies reveal that information authoritativeness, communication fidelity, and honesty in collaboration are three key factors that affect the level of achievable collaboration. An example is given for illustrating the use of the proposed technique to prevent multiple collaborative users from deriving sensitive information via inference.
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INTRODUCTION
A CCESS-CONTROL mechanisms are commonly used to protect users from the divulgence of sensitive information in data sources. However, such techniques are insufficient because malicious users may access a series of innocuous information and then employ inference techniques to derive sensitive data by using that information. To address this inference problem, we develop an inference detection system that resides at the central directory site. Because inference channels can be used to provide a scalable and systematic sound inference, we construct a semantic inference model (SIM) that represents all the possible inference channels from any attribute in the system to the set of preassigned sensitive attributes. The SIM can be constructed by linking all the related attributes, which can be derived via attribute dependency from data dependency, database schema, and semantic related knowledge. Based on the SIM, the violation detection system keeps track of a user's query history. When a new query is posed, all the channels where sensitive information can be inferred will be identified. If the probability of inferring sensitive information exceeds a prespecified threshold, then the current query request will be denied.
This inference detection approach is based on the assumption that users are isolated and do not share information with one another. This assumption, however, may not be the case in a real-life situation. Most users usually work as a team, and each member can access the information independently. Afterward, the members may merge their knowledge together and jointly infer the sensitive information. Generalizing from a single-user collaborative system to a multiuser collaborative system greatly increases the complexity of the inference detection system. This motivates us to extend our research from a singleuser case to a multiple-user case, where users may collaborate with each other to jointly infer sensitive data. We have conducted a set of experiments by using our inference violation detector as a testbed to understand the characteristics in collaboration and the effect on collaborative inference. From the experiments, we learn that for a given specific task, the amount of information that flows from one user to another depends on the closeness of their relationships and the knowledge related to the task. Thus, collaborative inference for a specific task can be derived by tracking the query history of all the users together with their collaboration levels (CLs).
RELATED WORK
Database inferences have been extensively studied. Many approaches to address the inference problem were presented in [14] . Particularly, Delugach and Hinke used database schema and human-supplied domain information to detect inference problems during database design time [12] , [20] , [21] . Garvey et al. developed a tool for database designers to detect and remove specific types of inference in a multilevel database system [17] . Both approaches use schema-level knowledge and do not infer knowledge at the data level. These techniques are also used during database design time and not at runtime. However, Yip and Levitt pointed out the inadequacy of schema-level inference detection, and they identify six types of inference rules from the data level that serve as deterministic inference channels [38] . In order to provide a multilevel secure database management system, an inference controller prototype was developed to handle inferences during query processing. Rule-based inference strategies were applied in this prototype to protect the security [34] . Further, since data update can affect data inference, Farkas et al. [15] proposed a mechanism that propagates update to the user history files to ensure that no query is rejected based on the outdated information. To reduce the time in examining the entire history login computation inference, Toland et al. [35] proposed using a prior knowledge of data dependency to reduce the search space of a relation and thus reduce the processing time for inference.
The previous work on data inference mainly focused on deterministic inference channels such as functional dependencies. The knowledge is represented as rules, and the rule body exactly determines the rule head. Although such rules are able to derive sound and complete inference, much valuable nondeterministic correlation in data is ignored. Further, many semantic relationships, as well as data mining rules, cannot be specified deterministically. To remedy this shortcoming, we propose a probabilistic inference approach to treat the query-time inference detection problem. The contribution of the paper consists of 1) deriving probabilistic data dependency, relational database schema, and domain-specific semantic knowledge and representing them as probabilistic inference channels in a SIM, 2) mapping the instantiated SIM into a Bayesian network for efficient and scalable inference computation, and 3) proposing an inference detection framework for multiple collaborative users.
THE INFERENCE FRAMEWORK
The proposed inference detection system consists of three modules, as shown in Fig. 1 .
The Knowledge Acquisition module extracts data dependency knowledge, data schema knowledge, and domain semantic knowledge. Based on the database schema and data sources, we can extract data dependency between attributes within the same entity and among entities. Domain semantic knowledge can be derived by semantic links with specific constraints and rules. A SIM can be constructed based on the acquired knowledge.
The SIM is a data model that combines data schema, dependency, and semantic knowledge. The model links related attributes and entities, as well as semantic knowledge needed for data inference. Therefore, SIM represents all the possible relationships among the attributes of the data sources. A semantic inference graph (SIG) can be constructed by instantiating the entities and attributes in the SIM. For a given query, the SIG provides inference channels for inferring sensitive information.
Based on the inference channels derived from the SIG, the Violation Detection module combines the new query request with the request log, and it checks if the current request exceeds the prespecified threshold of information leakage. If there is collaboration according to collaboration analysis, the Violation Detection module will decide whether a current query will be answered based on the acquired knowledge among the malicious group members and their CL to the current user.
KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION FOR DATA INFERENCE
Since users may pose queries and acquire knowledge from different sources, we need to construct a SIM for the detection system to track user inference intention. The SIM requires the system to acquire knowledge from data dependency, database schema, and domain-specific semantic knowledge.
Data Dependency
Data dependency represents causal relationships and nondeterministic correlations between attribute values. Because of its nondeterministic nature, the dependency between two attributes A and B is represented by conditional probabilities p ijj ¼ P rðB ¼ b i jA ¼ a j Þ. Thus, the nondeterministic data dependency is a more general representation than the relational functional dependency or other types of deterministic relationships. There are two types of nondeterministic data dependencies, as defined in the Probabilistic Relational Model (PRM) [13] , [16] : dependency within entity and dependency between related entities. Dependency within entity. Let A and B be two attributes in an entity E. If B depends on A, then for each instance of E, the value of attribute B depends on the value of attribute A with a probability value. To learn the parameter of dependency within entities from relational data, from a relational table that stores entity E, we can derive the conditional probabilities p ijj ¼ P rðB ¼ b i jA ¼ a j Þ via a sequential scan of the table with a counting of the occurrences of A and B and the co-occurrences of A and B.
Dependency between related entities. Let A be an attribute in entity E 1 and C be an attribute in E 2 . E 1 and E 2 are related by R, which is a relation that can be derived from the database schema. If C depends on A, then only for related instances of E 1 and E 2 would the value of attribute C in E 2 instances depend on the value of attribute A in related instances of E 1 . Such dependency only exists for related instances of entities E 1 and E 2 . The parameters of dependency between related entities can be derived by first joining the two entity tables based on the relation R and then scanning and counting the frequency of the occurrences of the attribute pair in the joined table. If two entities have an m-to-n relationship, then the associative entity table can be used for joining the related entity tables to derive dependency between related entities [8] .
Database Schema
In relational databases, database designers use data definition language to define the data schema. The owners of the entities specify the primary key and foreign key pairs. Such pairing represents a relationship between two entities. If entity E 1 has primary key pk, entity E 2 has foreign key fk, and e 1 :pk ¼ e 2 :fk, then the dependency between related entities from attribute A (in e 1 ) to attribute C (in e 2 ) can be derived.
Domain-Specific Semantic Knowledge
Other than data dependencies inside relational data sources, outside information such as domain knowledge can also be used for inferences. Specifically, domain-specific semantic relationships among attributes and/or entities can supplement the knowledge of malicious users and help their inference. For example, the semantic knowledge "can land" between Runway and Aircraft implies that the length of Runway should be greater than the minimum Aircraft landing distance, and the width of Runway should be greater than the minimum width required by Aircraft. If we know the runway requirement of aircraft C-5, and C-5 "can land" in the instance of runway r, then the values of attributes length and width of r can be inferred from the semantic knowledge. Therefore, we want to capture the domain-specific semantic knowledge as extra inference channels in the SIM.
Semantic knowledge among attributes is not defined in the database. However, from a large set of semantic queries posed by the users, we can extract the semantic constraints [43] . For example, in the WHERE clause of the following query, clauses 3 and 4 are the semantic conditions that specify the semantic relation "can land" between entity Runways and entity Aircraft. Based on this query, we can extract semantic knowledge "can land." 
SEMANTIC INFERENCE MODEL
SIM represents dependent and semantic relationships among attributes of all the entities in the information system. The related attributes (nodes) are connected by three types of relation links: dependency link, schema link, and semantic link. The dependency link connects dependent attributes within the same entity or related entities. Consider two dependent attributes: A and B. Let A be the parent node and B be the child node. The degree of dependency from B to A can be represented by the conditional probabilities
The conditional probabilities of the child node, given all of its parents, are summarized into a conditional probability table (CPT) that is attached to the child node. For instance, Fig. 3 shows the CPT of the node "TAKEOFF_LANDING_CAPACITY" of the SIM in Fig. 2 . The conditional probabilities in the CPT can be derived from the database content [13] , [16] . For example, the conditional probability P rðB ¼ b i jA ¼ a j Þ can be derived by counting the co-occurrence frequency of events Fig. 3 . The CPT for the attribute "TAKEOFF_LANDING_CAPACITY" summarizes its dependency on its parent nodes. The conditional probabilities in the CPT can be derived from the database content.
1. Clearly, the set of the semantic queries may be incomplete, which can result in the semantic knowledge being incomplete as well. However, additional semantic knowledge can be appended to the SIM as the system gains more semantic queries. The system can then reset to include the new knowledge. Otherwise, this will result in inference with knowledge update and is beyond the scope of this paper.
B ¼ b i and A ¼ a j and dividing it by the occurrence frequency of event A ¼ a j .
The schema link connects an attribute of the primary key to the corresponding attribute of the foreign key in the related entities. For example, in Fig. 2 , APORT_NM is the primary key in AIRPORTS and foreign key of RUNWAYS. Therefore, we connect these two attributes via a schema link.
The semantic link connects attributes with a specific semantic relation. To evaluate the inference introduced by semantic links, we need to compute the CPT for nodes connected by semantic links. Let T be the target node of the semantic link, P S be the source node, and P 1 ; . . . ; P n be the other parents of T, as shown in Fig. 4 . The semantic inference from a source node to a target node can be evaluated as follows.
If the semantic relation between the source and the target node is unknown or if the value of the source node is unknown, then the source and target nodes are independent. Thus, the semantic link between them does not help inference. To represent the case of the unknown semantic relationship, we need to introduce the attribute value "unknown" to the source node and set the value of the source node to "unknown." In this case, the source and target nodes are independent, that is,
When the semantic relationship is known, the conditional probability of the target node is updated according to the semantic relationship and the value of the source node. If the value of the source node and the semantic relation are known, then P rðT ¼ t i jP 1 ¼ v 1 ; . . . P n ¼ v n ; P S ¼ s j Þ can be derived from the specific semantic relationship. For example, the semantic relation "can land" between Runway and Aircraft (Fig. 5a ) implies that the length of Runway is greater than the minimum required Aircraft landing distance. Thus, the source node is aircraft_min_ land_dist, and the target node is runway_length. Both attributes can take three values: "short," "medium," and "long." First, we add the value "unknown" to source node aircraft_min_land_dist and set it as a default value. Then, we update the conditional probabilities of the target node to reflect the semantic relationship. Here, we assume that runway_length has an equal probability of being short, medium, or long. When the source node is set to "unknown," the runway_length is independent of aircraft_min_land_dist, and when the source node has a known value, the semantic relation "can land" requires that runway_length is greater than or equal to aircraft_ min_land_dist. The corresponding CPT for the node runway_length is shown in Fig. 5b .
Computation Complexity of Constructing Semantic Inference Model
A SIM consists of linking related attributes (structure) and their corresponding conditional probabilities (parameters). Given a relational database, the learning of a SIM can be decomposed into two tasks: parameter learning and structure learning. In the first task, we assume that the structure of the SIM is known-that is, the links between attributes are fixed-and our goal is to derive the CPTs for each attribute. Since the parameters of semantic link are determined by its semantic constraint, let us now consider the computation complexity on learning the parameters of data dependencies. Consider that given that structure S has m attributes, each attribute A i in table T j has a set of parents P ðA i Þ. If all parents of A i are in the same table with A i , then the CPT of A i can be derived by a single scan of T j . If attribute A i has a parent from related entity table T k , then scanning on the joined table of T j and T k is needed to derive the CPT of A i . In the worst case, the parameters can be learned in Oðm Å i n i Þ time, where m is the total number of attributes in the model, and n i is the size of the ith table. When the number of dependency between related entities is limited, the parameter learning can be reduced to approximately Oð P i m i n i Þ, where m i ð< mÞ is the number of attributes in the ith table. If the structure of the SIM is not given by domain experts, we can generate a set of candidate structures with their corresponding parameters and select the one that best matches the data sources. Algorithms for searching good dependency structures can be found in [13] and [18] .
Semantic Inference Graph
To perform inference at the instance level, we instantiate the SIM with specific entity instances and generate a SIG, as shown in Fig. 6 . Each node in the SIG represents an attribute for a specific instance. Related attributes are then connected via instance-level dependency links, instance-level schema links, and instance-level semantic links. The attribute nodes in the SIG have the same CPT as in the SIM because they are just instantiated versions of the attributes in entities. As a result, the SIG represents all the instance-level inference channels.
Instance-level dependency link. When a SIM is instantiated, the dependency within entity is transformed into dependency within instance in the SIG. Similarly, the dependency between related entities in the SIM is transformed into a dependency between two attributes in the related instances. This type of dependency is preserved only if two instances are related by the instantiated schema link. That is, if attribute B in instance e 2 depends on attribute A in instance e 1 , and instances e 1 and e 2 are related by R, denoted as Rðe 1 ; e 2 Þ, then there is a dependency between related instances from B to A.
Instance-level schema link. The schema links between entities in the SIM represent "key, foreign key" pairs. At the instance level, if the value of the primary key of an instance e 1 is equal to the value of the corresponding foreign key in the other instance e 2 , then connecting these two attributes will represent the schema link at the instance level.
Instance-level semantic link. At the instance level, assigning the value of the source node to "unknown" disconnects the semantic link between the attributes of two instances. On the other hand, if two instances have a specific semantic relation, then the inference probability of the target node will be computed based on its CPT and the value of the source node.
Evaluating Inference in Semantic Inference Graph
For a given SIG, there are many feasible inference channels that can be formed via linking the set of dependent attributes. Therefore, we propose to map the SIG to a Bayesian network to reduce the computational complexity in evaluating the user inference probability for the sensitive attributes.
For any given node in a Bayesian network, if the value of its parent node(s) is known, then the node is independent of all its nondescending nodes in the network [22] , [19] , [23] , [31] . This independence condition greatly reduces the complexity in computing the joint probability of nodes in the network. Specifically, let x i be the value of the node X i , pa i be the values of the parent nodes of X i , and P ðx i jpa i Þ denotes the conditional probability of x i , given pa i , where i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; n. The joint probability of the variables x i is reduced to the product of P ðx i jpa i Þ:
The probability of users inferring the sensitive node S ¼ s,
which can be further computed by using (1). Thus, the probability of inferring a sensitive node can be computed from the conditional probabilities in the network. Many algorithms have been developed to efficiently perform such calculations [10] , [24] , [27] , [45] , [44] . The PRM is an extension of the Bayesian network that integrates schema knowledge from relational data sources [13] , [18] , [16] . Specifically, PRM utilizes a relational structure to develop dependency between related entities. Therefore, in PRM, an attribute can have two distinct types of parent-child dependencies-dependency within entity and dependency between related entities-which match the two types of dependency links in the SIM. Since the semantic links in the SIM are similar to dependency links, we can convert each SIM to a PRM-based model. The corresponding Bayesian network can be generated after instantiating the model to the instance level. Thus, for a given network, the probability of inferring a specific sensitive attribute can be evaluated via efficient Bayesian inference algorithms. In our testbed, we use Sensitivity Analysis, Modeling, Inference, and Many More (SamIam) [32] , which is a comprehensive Bayesian network tool developed by the Automated Reasoning Group, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), to compute the inference. The computation complexity for the exact inference is mostly Oðn Á expðwÞÞ, where n is the number of nodes, and w is the tree width of the network [4] , [2] , [6] , [11] , [24] , [44] and is scalable.
We have measured the elapsed time for inference computation from our testbed. Since all attribute nodes in the Bayesian network need to be reevaluated, after posing each query, the time required for inference evaluation is almost constant. 2. For a sequence of queries, only a selected subset of all attribute nodes in the Bayesian network needs to be reevaluated after each query; thus, the computation time may be optimized for a large-sized network. The current implementation of the SamIam does not provide this optimization feature.
40 nodes and 28 edges, the elapsed time for inference evaluation after a single user poses a random query is around 16 ms on a Dell desktop with a 3.20-GHz CPU and 2-Gbyte RAM.
INFERENCE VIOLATION DETECTION FOR INDIVIDUAL USERS
SIGs provide an integrated view of the relationships among data attributes, which can be used to detect inference violation for sensitive nodes. In such a graph, the values of the attributes are set according to the answers of the previous posted queries. Based on the list of queries and the user who posted those queries, the value of the inference will be modified accordingly. If the current query answer can infer the sensitive information greater than the prespecified threshold, then the request for accessing the query answer will be denied [3] . Consider the example in Fig. 3 . Let the TAKEOFF_LAN-DING_CAPACITY of any airport be the sensitive attribute, and it should not be inferred with any probability greater than 70 percent. If the user has known that 1) aircraft C-5 can land in airport LAX runway r1, and 2) C-5 has aircraft_min_land_dist = long and aircraft_min_runway_ width = wide, then this user is able to infer the sensitive attribute "LAX's TAKEOFF_LANDING_CAPACITY = large" via (2) and (1), with a probability of 58.30 percent, as shown in Fig. 7a . Now, if the same user poses another query about the "Parking_sq_ft of LAX" and if this query is answered (as shown in Fig. 7b ; LAX_Parking_Sq_Ft = large), then the probability of inferring LAX_TAKEOFF_LANDING_CA PACITY = large by this user will increase to 71.50 percent, which is higher than the prespecified threshold. Thus, this query request should be denied.
INFERENCE VIOLATION DETECTION FOR COLLABORATIVE USERS
Generalizing from the single-user collaborative system to the multiuser collaborative system greatly increases the complexity and presents two challenges for building the inference detection system. First, we need to estimate the effectiveness of collaboration among users, which involves such factors as the authoritativeness of the collaborators, the communication mode among collaborators, and the honesty of the collaboration. In addition, we need to properly integrate the knowledge from collaborators on the inference channels for the inference probability computation.
Collaboration Effectiveness
We shall define CL as a metric for measuring the percentage of useful information flow from the information source to the recipient. The range of CL is from 0 to 1. CL ¼ 0 and CL ¼ 1 mean that none or all of the information is received by the recipient. Consider users A and B in Fig. 8 . User B has a collaborative level of 85 percent for the information from A. Let Q A and Q B be the query answer sets of users A and B. User B can combine Q A with his own previous query answer set Q B and yield a higher inference probability for the sensitive node. For the example in Fig. 7a , user B has past query answers Q B ¼fC5 min land dist ¼ long;
C-5 min rw width ¼ wideg and then combines this with his acquired knowledge from user A Q A ¼ fLAX Park Sqft ¼ largeg. Such collaboration increases the inference probability for the sensitive node from 58.30 percent to 66.55 percent, as shown in Fig. 8 . Note that because the collaborative level of B for the information from A is 85 percent, it yields a lower inference probability than the case where user B queries directly about LAX_Parking_Sq_Ft, as in Fig. 7b . By a series of experimental studies, we find that the CL depends on three components: the authoritativeness of the information provider A, the honesty of the collaboration H, and the fidelity of the communication channel between the provider and recipient F.
The authoritativeness of the information provider represents how accurate the information is. If a provider is knowledgeable and has high reputation in the field related with the task, then he/she can provide more accurate information.
Honesty represents the honesty level of the provider and his/her willingness of releasing his/her knowledge to the recipient. For example, if user A is very knowledgeable, and A and B have a good communication channel, then both the authoritativeness and fidelity of user A are high. However, A is not willing to release his full knowledge to B. As a result, the useful information cannot reach B for inference. Further, A can deceive B with false information. Thus, we shall use the honesty measure as an indication of the honesty in collaboration.
Fidelity measures the effectiveness of the communication between the provider and recipient. Poor mode of communication can cause information loss during the transmission, which reduces the effectiveness of the collaboration.
Authoritativeness measures how accurate the provider can supply information, honesty describes the willingness of the provider to release the accurate information, and fidelity measures the percentage of information transferred to the recipient due to the limitation of the communication mode. Once we estimate these three components for a set of users on a specific task, we can derive the CL, as will be described in Section 8.3.
Combining Knowledge from Collaborators
In this section, we study the combination of knowledge from collaborators on different types of inference channels. Based on the users' query history, there are two different types of collaborative user pairs, as shown in Fig. 9 :
Collaboration with nonoverlap inference channels and Collaboration with overlap inference channels.
Collaboration with nonoverlap inference channels. In this case, the two users pose queries on different nonoverlap inference channels. The inference probability will be computed based on their combined knowledge discounted by their collaborative level.
For example, two collaborators, A and B, ask queries on nonoverlap inference channels. In addition, the CL from users A to B is given by CL AB , and the CL from B to A is CL AB . Therefore, to compute the inference probability of the security attribute of user A, the query answers acquired by B ðQ B Þ can be combined with his/her own query answers ðQ A Þ, but this is discounted by the collaborative level CL BA . On the other hand, to derive the inference probability of user B, A's query answers ðQ A Þ are discounted by CL CL AB and then combined with Q B . Because Q A and Q B are from independent nonoverlap inference channels, their inferences to sensitive node S are independent and can be directly combined. Thus, the inference probability for the sensitive node can be computed based on the user's knowledge from his past queries combined with his collaborator's query answers discounted by their respective collaborative level.
Collaboration with overlap inference channels. In this case, the query sets posed by the two users overlap on inference channels. Such overlap may cause the users to have inconsistent belief in the same attribute on the inference channel. Thus, we need to integrate the overlapping knowledge according to the collaborative level to compute the appropriate inference probability.
For collaboration with overlap inference channels, the queries posed by users A and B overlap on their inference channels. Since Q A and Q B may cause inconsistent belief on some attribute nodes, these two query answer sets cannot Fig. 8 . Example of inference violation detection for multiple users. User B knows "C5 min land dist ¼ long" and "C5 min rw width ¼ wide" from his past query answers. User B also has the knowledge from A "LAX Park Sqft ¼ large," with a collaborative level of 85 percent. Thus, the probability of user B inferring the sensitive information (shown in double ellipses) "LAX Takeoff Landing Capacity ¼ large" increases to 66.55 percent. be simply combined. For example, in Fig. 10a , for attribute node X, Q A indicates that A has known that X ¼ x, and B can believe it, with CL CL AB ðCL AB 1Þ. On the other hand, Q B includes Y ¼ y, which can infer that X ¼ x, with probability p. If p 6 ¼ CL AB , then Q A , and Q B can cause B to have inconsistent belief on attribute X. Without loss of generality, we assume that p < CL AB in this example.
To represent the integration of inconclusive belief, we introduce the concept of soft evidence in probability calculus [7] . Soft evidence is inconclusive or unreliable information. As in the previous example, A tells B that X ¼ x, and B only believes it with CL AB ðCL AB < 1Þ. For user B, X ¼ x is inconclusive knowledge, and therefore, it needs to be set as soft evidence. To specify the soft evidence, we use the Virtual Evidence method developed in [7] . As shown in Fig. 10b , this method first adds a virtual attribute node V A ðXÞ to be the child of the attribute node X to represent the event of receiving the soft evidence of X; that is, A tells B about X ¼ x. Then, the conditional probability of the virtual node is determined by the reliability of the soft evidence. In our example, both PrðV A ðXÞ ¼ xjX ¼ xÞ and PrðV A ðXÞ ¼ " xjX ¼ " xÞ are determined by user B's CL of information from A CL AB . Thus, the soft evidence can be integrated into the user's own knowledge. In the example, if, originally, B is ignorant about X, once A tells B about X ¼ x, B will believe X ¼ x, with probability CL AB . If, originally, B can infer X, with knowledge Y ¼ y, then his current belief in X ¼ x can be computed as PrðX ¼ xjY ¼ y; V A ðXÞ ¼ xÞ. Thus, we are able to integrate query answers on overlap inference channels from multiple collaborators based on their corresponding CLs.
An Example of Inference Violation Detection for Collaborative Users
Due to the classified nature of the transportation data sources, users can only access limited amounts of information for mission planning. Malicious users want to identify whether a specific facility is capable of launching certain classified missions. Therefore, they apply inference techniques to infer the otherwise inaccessible information. In the following example, we shall demonstrate how our detection system prevents these users from accessing the relevant information. Based on these dependency links, schema links, and semantic links, a reduced SIM was constructed (Fig. 11) to represent all the possible inference channels between data attributes for all the entities. To carry out the inference computation, we need to generate a SIG by substituting the specific instance to the SIM. The corresponding Bayesian network representation mapped from the SIG for airport "LAX" is shown in Fig. 12 .
Let "Launch Mission?" be the sensitive attribute. The violation detection module examines each user's past query log and the current query request. The probability of inferring "Launch Mission?" in the Bayesian network will be evaluated before answering each query. If answering the current query increases the certainty of inferring the sensitive attribute above the prespecified threshold, then the query will be denied. Let the prespecified threshold for "Launch Mission?" be 60 percent, and the users have prior knowledge that 1) aircraft C-5 can land in airport LAX and 2) airport LAX can load weapon HC-1. When user A poses the sequence of queries shown in Table 1 , each query answer will update his certainty of inferring the "Launch Mission? = yes" (as shown in the table). The same is true for user B when he poses the queries in Table 2 . Tables 1 and 2 assume that users A and B do not collaborate. Neither A nor B gets enough information to infer the sensitive attribute above the threshold; thus, all the queries are answered. However, based on the questionnaires collected from these two users, we notice that they are collaborators with an 85 percent collaborative level from B to A for this specific "airport mission" task. Therefore, the knowledge from their query answers can be combined for collaborative inference. If we examine their query set Q A and Q B on the SIM, we notice that they do not have overlapping inference channels. This is because Q A focused on the fueling and cargo storage of the airport, whereas Q B focused on the takeoff and landing activities and military instrument handling. Thus, users A and B belong to the "nonoverlap inference channels" case, as shown in Fig. 9 . We can directly integrate their knowledge from query set answers based on their social relation. Thus, user B can integrate Q A into Q B and adjust the inference probability by using their respective collaborative levels, as shown in Table 3 . Based on Table 3 , we note that the last query posed by user B will infer sensitive information, with probability higher than the prespecified threshold of 60 percent. Therefore, Q B ð4Þ should be denied by the violation detection module. In contrast, in the noncollaborative case, as shown in Tables 1 and 2 , all the above queries can be answered.
N-Collaborators
Therefore, for any two collaborative users, we can integrate one's knowledge to the other and detect their inference toward sensitive data. When any user poses a query, the system not only checks if the query requester can infer sensitive data above the threshold with a query answer but also checks the other team members to guarantee that the query answer will not indirectly let them infer the sensitive attribute. We can iteratively generalize the above approach to an n-collaborator case. In general, when there are n collaborative users in the team, the violation detection system tracks the query posed by every team member. A query should be denied if the query answer will increase the certainty of any team member inferring the sensitive data above the prespecified threshold.
Since the system needs to evaluate the inference probability for every collaborator, the time required for inference evaluation increases as the number of collaborator increases. In our testbed, on a sample Bayesian network with 40 nodes, after any user in a group of collaborators poses a random query, the time for inference evaluation ranges from 15 ms for a single user to 281 ms for five collaborators when their CL ¼ 1. The evaluation time almost doubles when the CL is less than 1 because the system requires extra computation to insert virtual nodes.
COLLABORATION LEVEL
As stated in Section 7, information authoritativeness, honesty, and communication channel fidelity are three components of the CL metrics. In this section, we shall first conduct a set of experiments to validate the premise of the proposed metrics and then propose the integration of these three components to estimate the CL.
Experimental Study of Collaboration Level
Since authoritativeness, honesty, and fidelity are user sensitive, we used the students in one of the authors' classes as test subjects. The experiment was used as a homework for the class. A Web interface was developed for our inference testbed so that students could pose queries directly to the testbed and receive the answers. Before posing queries for inference, each student needed to register in the system and fill in the necessary background information, including their age, gender, major, year in school, courses taken, grade point average (GPA), skills, interests, teamwork ability, social activities, friends in the class, and so forth. The information gave us clues about the information authoritativeness and certain aspects of the fidelity of the test subjects.
Study the Effect of Authoritativeness and Fidelity
In the first experiment, our goal is to see how authoritativeness and fidelity affect the collaboration of multiple users. Based on the collected background information, we divided the class into five teams of four students to perform collaborative inference. The first team consisted of PhD students with good knowledge in the database area, which should have good authoritativeness. The second team members were good friends, which provide 
The probabilities are computed from the Bayesian Network in Fig. 12 .
TABLE 2
The Inference Probability of "Launch Mission? = Yes" after Answering User B's Queries
The probabilities are computed from the Bayesian Network in Fig. 12 . The Bayesian Network is used to compute the inference probability, in accordance with the posed query sequence, and adjusted by the collaborative levels of the corresponding answers.
good communication fidelity. The other three teams are randomly formed.
In test 1a, the teams were given the SIG structure based on the database, the security attribute, but not the SIG parameters (CPTs) nor the threshold (75 percent) of the security attribute. Then, we allowed each team to pose a fixed number of queries to infer the security attribute. The testbed computed the inference probability after each member posed the query. The system denied the query request if the posed queries exceeded the threshold. The four members in the team could collaborate in the best way possible to increase their inference probability of the security attribute. As shown in Fig. 13 (1a) , we observed that team 2 reached the highest inference probability. This is because they held meetings to discuss strategies of posing queries and voted if there was disagreement; therefore, their queries leveraged on each other to get better inference. This result reveals that communication fidelity plays a positive role in determining collaboration effectiveness.
In test 1b, we repeated the same experiment over these five teams. However, we let all the teams know the SIG structure, the CPTs, and the threshold value (65 percent) of the security attribute. As a result, this increased the authoritativeness of each team. With the same fixed number of queries, we noticed that with the additional knowledge of the CPTs and threshold of the security attribute, all the teams were able to ask better queries to improve their inference probability as close to the threshold as possible. Six queries were denied for four of the five teams due to the excess of the threshold during the process of this experiment. This experimental result reveals that the CL increases with the increase of authoritativeness.
In the second experiment, we investigated the collaboration effectiveness under controlled authoritativeness and communication fidelity. This experiment was carried out similar to experiment 1, except that it was conducted in another graduate class in the following quarter. Because of the small class size, we divided the students into three teams, each having three members.
To control the authoritativeness of the players, we gave each team different SIGs. The first team was given the full SIG with four inference channels, leading to the security attribute, the second team received half of the SIG with two channels, which can maximally infer the security attribute with a probability of 75 percent, and the third team only had knowledge of one inference channel in the SIG that can infer the security attribute up to 60 percent of inference probability. Therefore, for this inference task, the first team had authoritativeness value of 1, the second team had 0.75, and the third team had 0.6.
To study the effect of fidelity, we controlled the mode of communication in each team. The first team was allowed to have "full fidelity." Members were required to meet and discuss query strategies and exchange their query answers in making their selection of queries. The second team was allowed "limited fidelity," in which only member 1 can tell members 2 and 3 about his/her query answers, but members 2 and 3 could not communicate with each other and with member 1. The third team had "restricted fidelity" because only member 1 is allowed to tell member 2 the query answers, but members 2 and 3 are forbidden to talk to each other and to member 1.
As shown in Fig. 14 , the inference result of team 1 is higher than team 2, and team 2 is higher than team 3. This set of experimental results confirm our premise that information authoritativeness and communication fidelity can both positively affect the collaboration performance and therefore are two key components of the CL.
Among the six queries by each team, team 1 had two queries denied, and teams 2 and 3 had one query denied. These denied queries would have been answered if the collaboration within each team is unknown, and the team members were treated as separate individuals.
Study the Effect of Honesty in Collaboration
In the past two experiments, players in the same team are willing to release true knowledge to their teammates. The "honesty" for every information provider is 1, that is, totally willing to release true information. In the third experiment, we want to introduce a less honest scenario to test the effect of honesty to the CL. The third experiment was conducted based on the same three teams, as in the second experiment.
A proxy is introduced to study the "honesty" in the experiment. Users pose queries and receive answers from the proxy. As a result, the player cannot directly exchange the query answers with his/her team members. Thus, the proxy becomes the communication conduit among team Fig. 13 . The inference results for Experiment 1. In Experiment 1a, the teams were given the SIG structure, without the parameters (CPTs), and the threshold (75 percent) of the security node. In experiment 1b, the teams were given the SIG structure, the CPTs, and the inference threshold (65 percent) of the sensitive node. members and can alter the query answers to control the "honesty" in the experiment.
For example, in the three teams of this experiment, the proxy used three different levels of honesty to transfer the query answers. For the first team, the proxy does not send the exact answer of the original query but sends the answer of the parent node of the original query in the inference channel. Thus, it simulates the scenario of "unwilling collaboration," since the collaborators will have less knowledge for inference than the query requester himself. The loss of information can be measured as the inference probability from the "answered node" to the "original query node." For the first group, based on the tested Bayesian network, the average loss of information by answering the "parent" node is 0.7418. For the third group, the proxy answers the "grandparent" node of the original query, and the loss of information due to the less honesty can be measured as 0.6107. For the second group, the proxy gives the "opposite" answer of the original query node to the collaborators. For example, if the answer to the original query is "Fueling ¼ good," then the proxy sends the opposite answer "Fueling ¼ poor" to the collaborators. This simulates the scenario that the information source is "deceptive" and misleads the collaborators to believe in the opposite.
Since we use the same teams as in experiment 2, they have the same authoritativeness. Further, the proxy sends query answers directly to members in each team, and the fidelity values of the three teams are equal to 1.
As shown in Fig. 15 , the first team has the highest "honesty in collaboration" among the three teams and yields the best inference result. The collaboration of the third team is less honest than team 1; therefore, their collaboration yields lower inference than team 1. The members of the second team deceive each other, thus yielding the lowest inference result. This experimental result reveals that the collaboration honesty affects the CL. Less willingness to release information between collaborators reduces the collaboration effectiveness, and deception between collaborators causes negative effect in inference. Note that H ¼ 1 represents honest collaboration, which maximizes the collaboration effectiveness and can be used for conservative collaborative inference detection. Such overprotection may introduce false denial of legitimate queries.
Estimating Authoritativeness, Fidelity, and Honesty
Estimation of authoritativeness. Information authoritativeness represents the provider's capability of supplying accurate task-specific knowledge. This measurement can be derived based on the provider's profile such as education level, profession, experience with the specific area of the task, and reputation. For example, the answers to a carefully designed questionnaire at registration can be used as input for the estimation. We can take a weighted sum of the answers to related questions to estimate the authoritativeness of a user. In addition, the authoritativeness can also be enhanced by information derived from the relationship between users. If many individuals (especially highly authoritative ones) indicate user u i as their reference in this field, then u i has a significant impact on others and therefore has a higher authority. The link-based analysis (such as page rank) can be used to derive the reputation of people [30] , [25] . In general, the authoritativeness of the information provider can be derived from user profiles and/or questionnaire answers. When such background information is not available or incomplete, we can complement the authoritativeness from the provider's reputation among users. Estimation of fidelity. Fidelity measures the percentage of information sent by the provider that reaches the recipient side. Thus, fidelity depends on the quality of the communication channel and on the communication mode (for example, face-to-face meeting, e-mail, or through a third party).
Estimation of honesty. Honesty represents the willingness and truthfulness of the information release from the provider to the recipient. This is related with the evaluation of trust in peer-to-peer (P2P) networks [1] , [5] , [25] , [41] , [42] , [36] , [33] , [37] , [9] , [29] , which can be categorized by reputation-based or evidence-based approaches [28] . One approach is to use the reputation-based method, as proposed in [39] and [40] . The honesty level is recipient dependent. Therefore, for a given task, the honesty between two collaborators should also be estimated based on their closeness or friendship for a specific task. Therefore, the specific honesty of a provider to a specific recipient needs to be adjusted by the closeness between the collaborators for a given task. Further research in this area is needed.
Estimating Collaboration Level from a Training Set
Since the CL is user and task sensitive, we propose using a regression method to study the task-and user-specific relations between the CL and its parameters. Specifically, for a group of users and a specific task, we can treat A, H, and F as the predictors and the CL as the response variable. We can then learn the coefficients of these variables from the regressional model via the set of training data.
As an example, let the results of collaborative inference from experiments 2 and 3 under a controlled environment, with selected A, H, and F values (Table 4) , be a training set. Since the inference result obtained by a team reflects the collaboration effectiveness under the corresponding controlled environment, we can normalize the inference result (that is, the inference result of the security attribute divided by the threshold) as the estimate of the CL. Using the six entries as the input for regression analysis, the CL can be fit by multiple regression method with residual sum of squares 8:124 Â 10 À3 , as shown in Table 4 . Thus, we can estimate future CLs by substituting the parameters A, H, and F into the regression model for similar users and tasks.
ROBUSTNESS IN INFERENCE DETECTION
Usually, security experts or database administrators have some idea of the required level of protection for each security attribute, but they can hardly give a quantitative measurement to describe such protection requirements. Further, in a large database system, the dependency relationship between the security attribute and other attributes is complicated. The inference toward security attribute computed from a Bayesian network depends on both the network topology (qualitative attribute dependencies) and the parameter of the network (conditional probabilities). If a small variation of a given parameter can trigger the inference probability to exceed the threshold, then the inference detection may not satisfy the robustness requirements. This motivates us to find a methodology for systematically quantifying the robustness of the threshold.
Sensitivity measures the impact of small changes in a network parameter on a target probability value or distribution [26] . Therefore, the sensitivity values of attributes in the network provide an insight to the robustness of inference with respect to the changes in the attribute parameter value. In this section, we propose using the sensitivity analysis results to study the interrelationship between sensitive nodes and the security threshold.
Sensitivity Definition
"Sensitivity values are partial derivatives of output probabilities with respect to the parameters being varied in the sensitivity analysis. They measure the impact of small changes in a network parameter on a target probability value or distribution" [26] . More formally, for a function fðxÞ, the quantity is typically known as the sensitivity of f to x at x 0 , which is the ratio of relative change in output probability over the relative change in the parameter, where x 0 is the initial value of X. If we consider the function to be the probability of security node Y , given the change of attribute node X, then the sensitivity for attribute X at probability x 0 in a given network N, with the initial probability of the security node y init , can be represented as The initial probability of the security node is the probability of Y at the state when the set of evidence was given in the network. According to this definition, in a Bayesian network, if minor changes to an attribute node's probability can result in a significant change in the output probability of the security node, then this attribute node is considered highly sensitive.
Adjust Security Threshold by Attribute Sensitivity Analysis
In a large-scale network, because of the large number of attributes, it is time consuming to compute the sensitivity value for each attribute on the inference channels. However, for two attribute nodes on the same inference channel, the node that is closer to the security node is more sensitive than the node that is farther from the security node at the same probability value. This difference of sensitivity value between closer and farther nodes is intuitive, as closer nodes generally contain more sensitive information and are more influential on the security node than that of farther nodes. The farther node influences the security node through the inference channel, which includes the closer node. Therefore, the amount of change at the farther node has the equivalent effect of inferring the security node as a smaller (or equal) amount of change at the closer node. For example, in the inference channel in Fig. 16a , the closest attribute to security node "LaunchMission?" is "Fueling." The sensitivity of "Fueling" is greater than the sensitivity of its parents "LAX_Fueling_Activity" for all x 0 , as shown in Fig. 16b . Similarly, the sensitivity of "LAX_Fueling_Activity" is greater than the sensitivity of "Daily_Fuel_Consumption." When the data administrator proposes a threshold value based on the required protection level, he/she can check the sensitivity values of the closest attributes on inference channels. If one of these inference channels is too sensitive, which means that a small change in the attribute value can result in exceeding the threshold, then the threshold needs to be tightened to make it less sensitive. In cases where the threshold cannot be further lowered to satisfy the sensitivity constraints, we can block the access to the closest attribute to the security node on the most sensitive inference channel so that the accessible nodes on that inference channel are less sensitive to the threshold of the security node.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a technique that prevents users from inferring sensitive information from a series of seemingly innocuous queries. Compared to the deterministic inference approach in previous works, we include nondeterministic relations into inference channels for query-time inference detection. Specifically, we extract possible inference channels from probabilistic data dependency, the database schema, and the semantic knowledge, and we construct a SIM. The SIM links represent the possible inference channels from any attribute to the set of preassigned sensitive attributes. The parameters of attributes in SIM can be computed in polynomial time in terms of the rows and columns of the relational table. The SIM is then instantiated by specific instances and reduced to a SIG for inference violation detection at query time. To reduce the computation complexity for inference, the SIG can be mapped into a Bayesian network so that available Bayesian network tools can be used for evaluating the inference probability along the inference channels. When a user poses a query, the detection system will examine his/her past query log and calculate the probability of inferring sensitive information from answering the posed query. The query request will be denied if it can infer sensitive information, with probability exceeding the prespecified threshold.
In the multiple-user inference environment, the users can share their query answers to collaboratively infer sensitive information. Collaborative inference is related to the CL and the inference channels of the user-posed queries. For inference violation detection, we developed a collaborative inference model that combines the collaborators' query log sequences into inference channels to derive the collaborative inference of sensitive information.
A sensitivity analysis of attributes in the Bayesian network can be used for studying the sensitivity of the inference channels. Our study reveals that the nodes closer to the security node have stronger inference effects on the security node. Thus, a sensitivity analysis of these close nodes can assist domain experts to specify the threshold of the security node to ensure its robustness.
User profiles and questionnaire data provide a good starting point for learning CLs among collaborative users. However, gathering such information is complicated by the fact that the information may be incomplete and incorrect. In addition, the accuracy of such information is task specific and user-community sensitive. We have constructed a testbed on the inference violation detection system to study the CL for collaborative users. Our preliminary study reveals that information provider authoritativeness, communication fidelity, and honesty in collaboration play key roles in the CL. Further research and experiments in generating training sets to estimate and validate the CL are needed. 
